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4 AKRON LAW REVIEW (1)
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-SCOPE OF THE
TERM-"FRISK"
State v. Henry, 51 Ohio Op. 2d 303, 256 N.E. 2d 269 (C.P. 1969).
State v. Henry' is a case involving prosecution for the un-
lawful possession of narcotic drugs. Henry was convicted on
evidence obtained as a result of a "frisk." It should be made
clear at the outset that a "frisk" is not a "full" search as is per-
mitted in situations where there is probable cause for arrest. The
"frisk" is limited to a protective search or pat-down of the outer
clothing for the purpose of detecting weapons.2 Even though
probable cause is not a condition precedent to a "frisk," the
"frisk" is, nevertheless, governed by the Reasonableness Clause
of the Fourth Amendment. Where the "frisk" is deemed unrea-
sonable, its fruits are held to be inadmissible.3 The casenote will
set forth two tests or standards the courts use to determine rea-
sonableness vis a vis the Fourth Amendment. The casenote will
also establish the Henry4 court's failure to distinguish its case
from Sibron v. State of New York, 5 and thus the court's failure
to justify its holding.
The facts in Henry" reveal that during the process of routine
investigation for a traffic violation, the police officer was in-
formed by radio that the driver and motor vehicle were allegedly
carrying forged prescriptions. Defendant, a passenger in the car,
voluntarily alighted with his right hand in his coat pocket. The
officer requested defendant to remove his hand and upon refusal
the officer removed the hand and "frisked" defendant. Allegedly
clutched in defendant's hand, in plain sight of the officer, was
a small, yellow envelope containing heroin.
When does there arise a right to "frisk"? In Terry v. State
of Ohio,7 the police officer observed suspects "casing" a store and
after a "mumbled" 8 response to the officer's inquiries, the officer
1 Henry, 51 Ohio Op. 2d 303, 256 N.E. 2d 269 (C.P. 1969).
2 Sibran v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
3 Id.
4 Supra, note 1.
5 Supra, note 2.
6 Supra, note 1.
7 Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8 Id.
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grabbed Terry and patted down the outside of his clothing. It
was established that from these facts, the officer had reason to
believe the suspects were contemplating a violent crime-rob-
bery, and that he therefore had reason to believe that they may
have been armed and dangerous. The court held that a "frisk"
under these circumstances, is reasonable and therefore weapons
found as a result of such a "frisk" are admissible in evidence.
The court is careful to point out that, "In justifying the par-
ticular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to spe-
cific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." 9
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion clarifies the ra-
tionale for the holding in Terry.1 0 He states,
Ohio has not clothed its policemen with routine author-
ity to frisk and disarm on suspicion, in the absence of state
authority, policemen have no more right to "pat down" the
outer clothing of passers-by, or of persons to whom they ad-
dress casual questions, than does any other citizen. Conse-
quently, the Ohio courts did not rest the constitutionality of
this frisk upon any general authority in Officer McFadden
to take reasonable steps to protect the citizenry, including
himself, from dangerous weapons.
The state courts held instead, that when an officer is
lawfully confronting a possibly hostile person in the line of
duty he has a right, springing only from the necessity of the
situation and not from any broader right to disarm, to frisk
for his own protection."
The logical corollary from this holding is that where a "stop" on
less than probable cause is reasonable, the right to frisk must be
immediate and automatic where, as in Terry,2 the stop was
predicated on an articulable suspicion of a violent crime. There
9 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. This requirement is based on the rationale that
"The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is
assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the
laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge
who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in
light of the particular circumstances." In evaluating the reasonableness of
the search or seizure the courts use the following objective standard:
"would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the . . . search
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken
was appropriate? Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitution-
ally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate
hunches, a result this court has consistently refused to sanction."
10 Supra, note 7.
11 Terry, 392 U.S. at 32.
12 Supra, note 7.
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is no reason why the officer, under the above circumstances,
should have to ask one question before commencing a "frisk." 13
In Sibron,14 the officer observed the defendant over an eight-
hour period and saw him talking to known narcotics addicts
although the officer overheard no conversations and observed
nothing being transferred. When the officer confronted the de-
fendant the latter thrust his hand into his pocket and came out
with a packet of heroin. In holding that the evidence should
have been suppressed, the court citing Terry,15 stated, "In the
case of a self-protective search for weapons, he (the officer) must
be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably in-
ferred that the individual was armed and dangerous." 16 The
court went on to say that, "The suspects mere act of talking with
a number of known narcotics addicts over an eight-hour period
no more gives rise to reasonable fear of life or limb on the part
of the police officer than it justifies an arrest for committing a
crime." 17
It is apparent that the court in Sibron1 8 is denying the rea-
sonableness of the "frisk" on the Terry19 standard of suspicion
of a violent crime. The inference is that the court does so be-
cause it could not be gainsaid that a crime involving narcotics
is that type of crime whose nature creates a substantial likeli-
hood that the suspect is armed. The question the author poses
is this: If an officer cannot reasonably believe that his life would
be endangered when approaching Sibron, a suspect who suddenly
thrusts his hand into his pocket, is his belief any more justified
when he approaches Henry, a passenger in a car who alights
with his hand in his pocket? With both crimes involving the
same subject matter-narcotics, only a strained interpretation
could lead to an affirmative response. One may then logically
conclude that the "frisk" in Henry," as in Sibron,21 could not be
validated on the Terry standard of suspicion of a violent crime.
13 See J. Harlan's concurring opinion in Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
14 Supra, note 2.
15 Supra, note 7.
16 Sibron, 392 U.S. at 64.
17 Id.
18 Supra, note 2.
19 Supra, note 7.
20 Supra, note 1.
21 Supra, note 2.
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The court in Sibron2 2 implies another situation which would
authorize a limited protective "frisk." This situation would allow
a "frisk" notwithstanding the nature of the crime, where an offi-
cer feels his life may be in jeopardy. There is some doubt in the
author's mind however, that this test could be applied in Ohio in
light of Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Terry.23 The au-
thor will concede the benefit of the doubt and will show not-
withstanding, that the Henry24 "frisk" under this standard was
also unreasonable.
Under this second test the courts still require the police offi-
cer to point to specific facts and circumstances that would justify
a fear of bodily harm.25 The courts allow such a "frisk" during
field interrogation on the ground that, "The answer to the ques-
tion propounded by the policeman may be a bullet ... " 26 The
Sibron27 court also denied justification for the frisk of Sibron on
this ground because no facts and circumstances were offered by
the officer to show a belief that he acted to protect himself. The
court said, "Nor did Patrolman Martin urge that when Sibron
put his hand in his pocket, he feared that he was going for a
weapon and acted in self-defense." 28 The court held that under
these circumstances, "An unarticulated 'finding' by an appellate
court . . . apparently to the effect that the officer's invasion of
Sibron's person comported with the Constitution because of the
need to protect himself, is not deserving of controlling defer-
ence." 29 Again the court in Henry30 fails to distinguish Sibron.8 1
The Henry32 court states ". . . Thus when the hand didn't come
out after one or more routine questions by the officer, he cer-
tainly by this time had probable cause to initiate reasonable pre-
caution for his own safety." 33 Clearly then the court is assuming
the officer was in fear of his life. The Supreme Court's ruling in
22 Supra, note 2.
23 Supra, note 7.
24 Supra, note 1.
25 C.F. Supra, note 9.
26 People v. Rivera, 252 N.Y.S. 2d 458, 463, 201 N.E. 2d 32, 35 (1964).
27 Supra, note 3.
28 Supra, note 7.
29 Id.
80 Supra, note 1.
31 Supra, note 2.
32 Supra, note 1.
33 51 Ohio Op. 2d at 304, 256 N.E. 2d at 270.
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Sibron34 expressly denies the validity of any such assumption.
(Emphasis added)
The conclusion reached is that the evidence in the principal
case should have been suppressed under either of the two tests
expounded by the Supreme Court in Terry35 and Sibron.36 As is
made readily apparent by the foregoing, the facts and circum-
stances in both Sibron3 7 and Henry38 are, for all intents and pur-
poses, the same, and consequently the Henry3 9 court's endeavor
to distinguish the two cases amounts to a distinction without a
difference. One may therefore conclude that the holding in the
principal case has unjustifiably expanded the right to "frisk" and
in so doing has contravened a citizen's Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches.
State v. Henry may present further problems with regard to
due process. Let us assume, arguendo, that the officer in Henry
would have had, under one or the other tests set forth, the right
to frisk.
The majority in both Terry4° and Sibron4 1 did not directly
rule on whether or not contraband other than weapons discov-
ered during a limited search could be used in a criminal prose-
cution.42 However, they did say a limited protective search per-
mits only a pat down of the outer garments in an effort to deter-
mine if the person is carrying a weapon and therefore, by impli-
cation, one may assume that an officer may not himself extract
anything that does not feel like a gun, knife, or some other form
of weapon.43
Is it not curious then, that in cases such as Henry44 where
the defendant is in fact carrying no weapon, he nevertheless
manages to be holding the contraband in his hand in plain sight
of the officer or it falls to the ground and becomes admissible as
34 Supra, note 2.
35 Supra, note 3.
36 Supra, note 2.
37 Id.
38 Supra, note 1.
39 Supra, note 1.
40 Supra, note 3.
41 Supra, note 2.
42 35 Brooklyn L. Rev. 147 (1968).
43 Peters v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 41 (1968).
44 Supra, note 1.
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"dropsy" as in State v. Mericle.45 Curiosity is elevated to sus-
picion in light of certain reports written by judges and investiga-
tors telling of perjured testimony given by a number of police
when testifying as to how incriminating evidence was obtained.
46
In these situations the standard to determine admissibility of
evidence comes down to the officer's word against that of the
accused. Who then is the court invariably to believe? No doubt
the officer. But should this be the case in view of investigations
which reveal more than infrequent use of perjured testimony?
The author is not contending that these police are neces-
sarily motivated by malice, but merely that in their overly zeal-
ous desire to maintain law and order, they may lose sight of the
rules and guidelines that are so vital to a sound functioning of
our constitutional system. It is incumbent then upon our courts
to enforce objective standards and to regard incriminating testi-
mony with more than mere cursory consideration. For to allow
the abuse of due process prevalent in this area to continue is to
allow that which the law proscribes directly to be accomplished
indirectly-an obvious absurdity.
The author is cognizant of the great increase in drug traffic
and is of the opinion that the continued use of drugs by young
people would certainly have a deleterious effect on society. But,
this adverse situation does not merit abrogation or even tem-
porary relaxation of constitutional safeguards. If in an effort to
thwart the evil, basic constitutional guarantees are brushed aside
and society becomes content to let the end justify the means, the
effect would most assuredly go beyond deleterious, indeed, the
effect would be pernicious.
ANTHONY J. OCCHIPINTI, JR.
45 43 Ohio Op. 2d 361, 235 N.E. 2d 150 (C.P. 1968).
46 Younger, "The Perjury Routine," vol. 204, The Natiorn, p. 596 (May 8,
1967); Chevigny, "Police Abuses in Connection with the Law Of Search and
Seizure," 5 Crim. L. Bull. 3 (1969).
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